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COMMENTS
IS THE SHRINK'S ROLE SHRINKING? THE AMBIGUITY OF
FEDERAL RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 12.2
CONCERNING GOVERNMENT PSYCHIATRIC
TESTIMONY IN NEGATIVING CASES

R. GREGORY COCHRANt
INTRODUCTION
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2 requires a defendant
to notify the government and the court if she intends either to
rely on a full-fledged insanity defense I or simply to use expert testimony about her mental condition 2 as it relates to the issue of

t J.D. Candidate 2000, University of Pennsylvania Law School; M.D. 1987, Georgetown
University School of Medicine; B.A. 1983, Emory University. I am deeply grateful to my
amazing fellow associate editors and to an undyingly energetic board of editors--especially
Alexander Abbe and the "execs"--whose diligence, insights, and attention to detail made this
piece truly a collaborative effort. I am also indebted to Professor Stephen Morse for his suggestion of the topic and general organizational framework for this Comment. Most importantly, my deepest and sincerest gratitude goes to my partner Michael, whose spirited and unselfish love and encouragement have helped to keep me on the right path.
I See FED. K. CRIM. P. 12.2(a) ("If a defendant intends to rely upon the defense of insanity at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant shall... notify the attorney for the government in writing of such intention ... ."); see also infra note 22 (providing the complete
text of Rule 12.2). Concerning the insanity defense itself, 18 U.S.C. § 17 provides in part:
(a) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE. It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any
Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.
18 U.S.C. § 17(a) (1994).
2 "Various terms, such as 'diminished capacity,' 'diminished responsibility' and 'insanity,' have been employed in the criminal law to describe offenses based on mental abnormality." Susan F. Mandiberg, Protecting Society and Defendants Too: The ConstitutionalDilemma of MentalAbnormalityandIntoxication Defenses, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 221, 222 n.6
(1984). The diminished capacity defense "allows a defendant to attempt to show that he could
not have had, and therefore did not have, the mental state required for conviction of the crime
charged." Frederic Ron Krausz, Comment, The Relevance ofInnocence: Proposition8 and
the DiminishedCapacityDefense, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1197, 1197 (1983). "Diminished responsibility" generally refers to a defense based on a showing that the accused suffered from an
abnormality of mind that affects her culpability. See R.J. Cooper, DiminishedResponsibility--"Borderline Insanity" Direction, 49 J. CRIM. L. 118, 118 (1985) (discussing the use of
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guilt.3

Legal scholars refer to this use of expert testimony as a

the diminished responsibility defense); see also Krausz, supra, at 1199 (describing "diminished responsibility" as a "quasi-insanity defense, a plea in mitigation which does not negate
the presence of any element of the crime," whereby the defendant is subject to lesser punishment because of his mental abnormality rather than the absence of mens rea); Jennifer Kunk
Compton, Note, Expert Witness Testimony and the Diminished CapacityDefense, 20 AM. J.
TRIAL ADvoc. 381, 381-97 (1996-97) (reviewing these defenses and their admissibility).
"'Diminished capacity,' as opposed to 'diminished responsibility,' is the term most often used
by American courts in referring to defenses aimed at negating specific intent, although this
term has also been used in referring to a defense offering evidence of mental disease or defect
to show mitigating circumstances." United States v. Frisbee, 623 F. Supp. 1217, 1221 n.2
(N.D. Cal. 1985). "[T]he several uses to which these labels have been put has often hindered
the correct application of the two very distinct ideas that are applied under one, both, or neither of these labels." United States v. Cameron, 907 F.2d 1051, 1063 (1 1th Cir. 1990).
"IN]either 'diminished capacity' nor 'diminished responsibility' are terms that accurately
describe a defense aimed at negating intent." Frisbee,623 F. Supp. at 1221 n.2. Like Professor Mandiberg, I will use the term "negativing" or "negativing defenses" to refer to the use of
evidence of mental defect in an attempt to prove that the defendant did not have the required
mens rea element of the crime. See Mandiberg, supra at 225 (using the term "'negativing defenses' for those defenses which, if believed, preclude the existence of elements of the offense"). I will also use the term "negativing defendant" to refer to a defendant who offers a
negativing defense.
Professor Mandiberg contrasts "negativing defenses" to "extrinsic defenses," which are
arguments that exculpate despite the state's proof of the elements of the crime. Id The latter
may include the insanity defense depending on the jurisdiction's insanity test. See id. at 22627 (explaining that evidence of insanity may be either negativing or extrinsic). Note that the
insanity defense is quite different from the negativing defenses. Generally, "a finding of insanity is not a determination that the crime was not committed because a requisite mental state
was lacking." Krausz, supra at 1198. Although some diminished capacity evidence may also
be relevant in an insanity inquiry, "the evidence is admitted for entirely different purposes: in
the case of diminished capacity, to show that no crime was committed; but in the case of insanity, to show that a criminal should not be punished." Id. at 1198-99.
3 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(b) ("If a defendant intends to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any other mental condition of the defendant bearing
upon the issue of guilt, the defendant shall ... notify the attorney for the government in writing of such intention ....
"); see also infra note 22 (providing the complete text of Rule 12.2).
Different courts and jurisdictions accept defendants' proffered psychiatric testimony to varying degrees, see Peter R. Dahli, Comment, Legal and Psychiatric Concepts and the Use of
PsychiatricEvidence in CriminalTrials, 73 CAL. L. REV. 411, 411 (1985) ("One reason for
resistance to the use of psychiatric knowledge by the law is lingering doubt about the scientific validity of psychiatry."), and those that are unwilling to do so in the context of negativing
defenses obviously will not need to labor over whether the prosecution has the right to examine the defendant. The federal and about half of the state jurisdictions allow expert psychiatric
evidence where it is relevant to negative the mens rea of specific intent crimes. See SANFORD
H. KADISH & STEPHEN J.SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 1004 (6th ed.
1995) (discussing contemporary trends on the use of mental disorder to negative mens rea).
Many recent opinions from different states, however, hold that expert psychiatric evidence is
never admissible to negative a required mental state, "even when the objective is solely to reduce first-degree to second-degree murder." Id. (citing Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820 (Fla.
1989); State v. Provost, 490 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. 1992)). Still other jurisdictions and the Model
Penal Code allow such evidence to negative the mens rea in all cases. See id. (citing the
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"negativing '4 defense because its purpose is to use mental abnormality evidence to negate or negative the mens rea element of the crime charged.5
Rule 12.2 also authorizes the court to compel a defendant asserting insanity
to be examined by a government psychiatrist or psychologist. 6 The rule is
ambiguous, however, regarding whether the court may similarly compel an
examination of a negativing defendant. 7 The courts have interpreted the
wording of Rule 12.2 inconsistently regarding this issue.8 Courts that have
read the rule to not require a negativing defendant to undergo a government
psychiatric examination, 9 however, have often found the "inherent author10
ity" to order at least some form of examination of a negativing defendant.
The result is that the government, in most cases, is allowed to examine the
negativing defendant, although perhaps not as extensively as it would be
allowed in the insanity context.
Model Penal Code and Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982), both of which allow evidence of mental disorder to negative the mens rea "of any crime").
4 See supranote 2 (explaining the use of this term in this Comment).
5 See Mandiberg, supra note 2, at 225-28 (giving examples of negativing defenses such
as mental abnormality or intoxication).
6 See FED. K. CRIM. P. 12.2(c) ("In an appropriate case the court may, upon motion of the
attorney for the government, order the defendant to submit to an examination pursuant to 18
U.S.C. [§] 4241 or [§] 4242."). When competency to stand trial and the insanity defense are
at issue, 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 and 4242 mandate a court to order, upon motion from the government, a psychiatric examination. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (dealing with competency); id
§ 4242 (dealing with insanity). See also infra note 25 for the complete text of the pertinent
portions of these statutes.
7 Rule 12.2(c), on its face, appears to apply only to competency and insanity examinations of the defendant and makes no mention of the use of psychiatric evidence in other contexts, such as negativing defenses. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c) (authorizing a government
psychiatric examination "in an appropriate case... pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [§] 4241 [competency examinations] or [§] 4242 [insanity examinations]"). Nor does the rule elaborate on the
nature of"an appropriate case." Thus, Rule 12.2(c) neither authorizes nor forbids compelled
government psychiatric examinations of negativing defendants. See United States v. Davis,
93 F.3d 1286, 1291 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that "[s]ection 4242 neither permits nor requires a court-ordered examination by the government regarding the defendant's 'mental condition' at the time of the alleged offense when the defendant gives notice of her intent to rely
on expert testimony on that subject").
8 CompareDavis, 93 F.3d at 1289-95 (holding that Rule 12(c) does not explicitly provide
authority for an examination of a negativing defendant), with United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d
29, 35 n.9 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that Rule 12(c) does provide this authority). For a more
detailed discussion of these and other cases, see infra notes 31-37, 39-86 and accompanying
text.
9 Psychiatric testimony is the type "most heavily employed in court." Dahli, supra note 3,
at 411 n.1. Except as may be otherwise noted, "psychiatry" will be used in this Comment to
include the field of psychology.
10 See, e.g., Davis, 93 F.3d.at 1295 (holding that the court's inherent authority was available to order a "reasonable, noncustodial examination" only after concluding that Rule 12(c)
did not authorize a compelled examination); see also infra notes 31-37, 39-86 and accompanying text (citing and discussing these and other cases).
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Compelling a criminal defendant who offers either an insanity or a
negativing defense to undergo a psychiatric examination by the government
raises significant constitutional and practical concerns." For example, Rule
12.2 provides that the information gained by the government during such an
examination may only be used "on an issue respecting mental condition on
which the defendant has introduced testimony." 12 Real concerns arise,
however, about how the government nonetheless might be able to use this
information improperly and bolster its case. Furthermore, since the rule is
unclear as to whether such an examination is required in the negativing
context, naturally it is also unclear about the specific type of examination
that might be allowed: a lengthy custodial inpatient examination, a brief
outpatient interview, or something in between.13
In order to frame more clearly the practical and constitutional implications of mandatory government psychiatric examinations in the context of a
negativing defendant, Part I of this Comment presents a hypothetical defen-

11

See infra Parts III and IV (outlining and analyzing the constitutional and practical con-

siderations that arise from an insanity or negativing defense). There is also disagreement over
whether disallowing negativing evidence is constitutional. See KADISH & SCHUILHOFER, supra note 3, at 1004 (explaining that half the states never allow the admission of psychiatric
testimony to negative mens rea, whereas the other half and the federal government do). Those
arguments, however, are beyond the scope of this Comment, which focuses only on the legal
issues concerning compelled government psychiatric examinations in the federal system and
in other jurisdictions where negativing defenses are allowed. See supra note 3 (discussing the
various ways different jurisdictions handle a defendant's attempt to offer a negativing defense). It should be noted, however, that there is precedent that a criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to present negativing evidence. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S.
284, 294 (1973) ("The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations."); Washington v. Texas,
388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (holding that a criminal defendant "has the right to present his own
witnesses to establish a defense" and that "[t]his right is a fundamental element of due process
of law"); see also Mandiberg, supra note 2, at 229 (pointing out the scholarly and judicial disagreement over whether the constitutional right to present evidence to negative a required
mental state originates from the Due Process Clauses or the Sixth Amendment); Compton,
supranote 2, at 406 (concluding that "prohibiting evidence of a mental abnormality [using the
mens rea variant of diminished capacity] is unfair to the defendant and probably unconstitutional"). The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code takes the position that such evidence is admissible. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (1962) ("Evidence that the defendant
suffered from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the
defendant did or did not have a state of mind which is an element of the offense."). Scholars
and judges alike agree, however, that the right to introduce negativing evidence "is not absolute, and that a balancing test weighing the competing interests of the defendant and the government should be used to determine whether it is constitutional for the government on any
particular occasion to burden the right to defend." Mandiberg, supra note 2, at 229 (citations
omitted).
12 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).
13 See, e.g., Davis, 93 F.3d at 1289-96 (opining that a 45-day involuntary commitment
would raise constitutional concerns, whereas a "reasonable, non-custodial" examination
would not).
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dant with psychiatric problems who faces a federal first-degree murder
charge and the death penalty.
Part II then examines the statutory interpretation of Rule 12.2(c) by
several United States courts of appeals that have analyzed this issue. Part II
also explores how these courts have treated the inherent authority issue and
concludes, through the examination of a recent federal trial court case, that
courts do have the inherent authority to order a government psychiatric examination of a negativing defendant. This determination supports the overall conclusion of this Comment that Rule 12.2 should be changed to allow
explicitly a government psychiatrist to examine a negativing defendant.
Part III then reviews the constitutional issues that arise in authorizing
the government to examine the negativing defendant-whether that authority is by virtue of Rule 12.2(c) or by virtue of the court's inherent authority
to do so. This Part asserts that if the government uses a psychiatrist's testimony, it must be limited-as the rule currently provides-to a rebuttal of
the defense psychiatrist's testimony. This Part concludes, though, that Rule
12.2 should go further in prohibiting the government from using evidence
derived from the psychiatric examination to strengthen its case. The Rule
should preclude the government psychiatrist from asking the defendant specific questions about prior criminal history if the defense examiner initially
did not ask these questions. Part III also suggests that, although videotaping
is preferable, at a minimum, the government should make a transcript of the
examination available to the defense.
Part IV briefly examines some of the practical implications of the conflicting interpretations of Rule 12.2(c), including issues impacting the discovery process. This Part concludes that these considerations also support a
revision of the rule that explicitly would allow the government to perform a
psychiatric examination of negativing defendants with appropriate constitutional safeguards.
Finally, taking these conclusions into account, Part V offers a revision
of Rule 12.2 that attempts to maximize the defendant's constitutional protections as well as the State's interest in prosecuting its case.
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I. AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE IMPLICATIONS
OF RULE 12.2's AMBIGUITY
14

A. A Hypothetical

John Barleycorn tells a very sad story. Raised in an alcoholic family
and physically and sexually abused regularly by both of his parents, John,
now twenty-eight years old, is a full-fledged alcoholic himself. Although he
managed to get through college, marry, and have two children, lately John
has been unable to hold down ajob for more than a few weeks at a time. He
has been hospitalized four times in the past year for alcoholism-related
medical conditions, and his wife and children have recently left him because
of his drinking. John has been through two inpatient and three outpatient
alcoholism rehabilitation programs and has attended meetings of Alcoholics
Anonymous on occasion but feels that his case is a "lost cause." He just
cannot seem to stop drinking.
One night six months ago, just after his family left him, John went on a
drinking binge to end all drinking binges. As is usual for John, he went into
a blackout and has no memory whatsoever of the evening's events after
about his third drink at the local pub. He "came to" Saturday morning in the
county jail, finding that he had been arrested for, among other things, firstdegree murder. The police informed him that he drove his car into a
crowded, upscale outdoor cafd, killing three people, including the Japanese
ambassador to the United States. While speeding toward the caf6, witnesses
heard John yelling out the car window, "Die and go to hell all you yuppies!". The government prosecutors intend to seek the death penalty. John
will be tried in federal court because of the involvement of the foreign dig5
nitary.1
In addition to the rehabilitation programs, John has sought the help of a
psychiatrist, Dr. Bill Wilson, several times in the past few years. Dr. Wilson believes that John suffers not only from alcoholism, but also from posttraumatic stress disorder as a result of his abusive childhood, as well as
major depression and generalized anxiety disorder.
Although quite sure that the evidence will not support an outright insanity defense, 16 John's attorney, Maria Fuentes, does believe that evidence

14

The facts of this hypothetical scenario are entirely the product of the author's imagina-

tion.

15See 18 U.S.C. § 1116(a) (1994) (authorizing federal jurisdiction over homicide cases

when the victim is a "foreign official, official guest, or internationally protected person").

16 The insanity defense in the federal system is an affirmative defense that requires the
defendant to prove that he "was unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongful-
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of John's mental abnormalities will be helpful to his case. She believes, and
Dr. Wilson confirms, that John's mental condition combined with his intoxication precluded him from being able to form the required mens rea for
first-degree murder that night.17 Unlike the insanity defense-which is difficult to prove and rarely successfiull a negativing defense such as diminished capacity, in jurisdictions where it is allowed, is more likely to help a
defendant who has slim chances of acquittal to obtain a conviction on a less
serious charge, such as second-degree murder or manslaughter.' 9 Because
the federal courts allow admission of negativing evidence, Maria has given
notice to the court and to the government pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 12.2(b) of her intent to introduce psychiatric testimony
as evidence of John's mental abnormality in an attempt to negative his mens
rea at the time of the killing. In response, the government's prosecutor has
moved the trial court to allow the State to perform its own psychiatric examination of John pursuant to Rule 12.2(c).2'

ness of his acts." Id. § 17(a); see also supra note 1 (providing the full text of 18 U.S.C.
§ 17(a)).
17 The mens rea required for first-degree murder in the federal system is "willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated." 18 U.S.C. § 1111.
Is See KADISH & SCHULHOFER, supra note 3, at 955 ("Nationally, insanity acquittals
probably represent no more than 0.25 percent of terminated felony prosecutions.").
19 See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969, 998 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (explaining that the use of evidence of an abnormal mental condition often arises in the context of
negativing the element of premeditation in a first-degree murder charge). The Unites States
Code distinguishes between first- and second-degree murder as follows:
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every
murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate,
malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt
to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage,
aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a
premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human
being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree.
Any other murder is murder in the second degree.
18 U.S.C. § 111 1(a). The Code defines manslaughter in the following manner:
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of two
kinds:
Voluntary-Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.
Involuntary-In the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or
in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.
Id. § 1126.
20 See FED. R. CRiM. P. 12.2(b) (providing that a defendant must provide the government
written notice of its intent to use expert psychiatric testimony); see also infra note 22 (providing the full text of this rule).
2f See FED. R. CRM. P. 12.2(c) ("In an appropriate case the court may, upon motion of
the attorney for the government, order the defendant to submit to an examination pursuant to
18 U.S.C. [§] 4241 or [§] 4242."); see also infra note 22 (providing the full text of this rule).
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B. UnresolvedIssues Raised by the Hypothetical
When reviewing Rule 12.2(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,22 Maria Fuentes notices that it allows the court, "[i]n an appropriate
case," to order a government psychiatric examination, but that it does not,
on its face, distinguish between the insanity defense and the negativing defenses. 23 She sees that the rule authorizes the court to "order the defendant
to submit to an examination pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [§] 4241 or [§] 4242. " 24
Maria then learns that 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241 and 4242 are statutes that pertain
to competency to stand trial and the insanity defense,
respectively, and that
25
they make no reference to negativing defenses.
22 FED. R_ CRIM. P. 12.2 states, in its entirety:
(a) DEFENSE OF INSANITY. If a defendant intends to rely upon the defense of in-

sanity at the time of the alleged offense, the defendant shall, within the time provided for the filing of pretrial motions or at such later time as the court may direct,
notify the attorney for the government in writing of such intention and file a copy of
such notice with the clerk. If there is a failure to comply with the requirements of
this subdivision, insanity may not be raised as a defense. The court may for cause
shown allow late filing of the notice or grant additional time to the parties to prepare
for trial or make such other order as may be appropriate.
(b) EXPERT TESTIMONY OF DEFENDANT'S MENTAL CONDITION. If a defendant

intends to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect or any
other mental condition of the defendant bearing upon the issue of guilt, the defendant
shall, within the time provided for the filing of pretrial motions or at such later time
as the court may direct, notify the attorney for the government in writing of such intention and file a copy of such notice with the clerk. The court may for cause shown
allow late filing of the notice or grant additional time to the parties to prepare for
trial or make such other order as may be appropriate.
(c) MENTAL EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT. In an appropriate case the court may,
upon motion of the attorney for the government, order the defendant to submit to an
examination pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [§] 4241 or [§] 4242. No statement made by the
defendant in the course of any examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination be with or without the consent of the defendant, no testimony by the expert based upon such statement, and no other fruits of the statement shall be admitted
in evidence against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced testimony.
(d) FAILURE To COMPLY. If there is a failure to give notice when required by
subdivision (b) of this rule or to submit to an examination when ordered under subdivision (c) of this rule, the court may exclude the testimony of any expert witness
offered by the defendant on the issue of the defendant's guilt.
(e) INADMISSIBILITY OF WrrDRAWN INTENTION. Evidence of an intention as to

which notice was given under subdivision (a) or (b), later withdrawn, is not, in any
civil or criminal proceeding, admissible against the person who gave notice of the
intention.
23 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).
24 Id.
25 18 U.S.C. § 4241 provides in relevant part:
At any time after the commencement of a prosecution for an offense and prior to
the sentencing of the defendant, the defendant or the attorney for the Government
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We should pause to ask why a defense attorney handling a negativing
case-aside from fearing that the government psychiatrist might testify adversely to her client-should be concerned that a pretrial psychiatric examination of her client may increase the likelihood of either a guilty verdict or
the death penalty. 26 One concern is that during the pretrial psychiatric examination of a defendant, the government psychiatrist may learn information from the defendant about his prior conduct that was previously inaccessible to the prosecution. 27 Furthermore, the government may use this
information to increase the likelihood of a higher-grade conviction or the
death penalty, even if the psychiatrist does not testify. 28 In this hypothetical, Maria Fuentes fears that the government's psychiatrist may, on the basis
of his or her examination, ultimately testify adversely to John Barleycorn.
She believes, however, that given its ambiguity, Rule 12.2 should permit the
court to compel such an examination only when the defendant is relying on
the insanity defense.
Rule 12.2 raises some unresolved issues.29 For example, as Maria
Fuentes discovered, 18 U.S.C. § 4242(a) requires "the court to order that the
defendant undergo a psychiatric or psychological examination once the defendant has filed a Rule 12.2 notice of intent to rely on an insanity defense
may file a motion for a hearing to determine the mental competency of the defendant. The court shall grant the motion, or shall order such a hearing on its own motion, if there is reasonable cause to believe that the defendant may presently be suffering from a mental disease or defect rendering him mentally incompetent to the
extent that he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the proceedings against him or to assist properly in his defense.
18 U.S.C. § 4241(a) (1994). 18 U.S.C. § 4242 provides in relevant part:
Upon the filing of a notice, as provided in Rule 12.2 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, that the defendant intends to rely on the defense of insanity, the
court, upon motion of the attorney for the Government, shall order that a psychiatric
or psychological examination of the defendant be conducted, and that a psychiatric
or psychological report be filed with the court ....
Id. § 4242(a) (emphasis added).
26 See Welsh S. White, Government PsychiatricExaminationsand the Death Penalty, 37
ARIZ. L. REV. 869, 869-71 (1995) (exploring the issue regarding why defense attorneys "believe that a government psychiatrist's pretrial examination of a capital defendant will enhance
the possibility that the defendant will receive the death penalty").
See id. at 870 (noting, for example, that "the government psychiatrist might learn that
the defendant engaged in prior violent conduct, including the commission of crimes for which
he had never been charged").
28 See id.
29 See TERENCE F. MACCARTHY & MARY M. ROWLAND, ILLINOIS INSTITUTE FOR
CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION, PRETRIAL DIsCOVERY IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES

§§ 7.39-.42 (1997) (enumerating some unresolved issues raised by previous versions of Rule
12.2 and explaining how the various amendments have attempted to address them, but confirming the persistent ambiguity of subsection (c) concerning the admissibility of compelled
government examinations of negativing defendants).
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(not on any other mental defense), and the government has responded by
requiring such an examination." 30 Federal courts are in disagreement regarding whether Rule 12.2(c) provides authority for a court-ordered mental
examination upon a defendant's notice of intent to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental defense other than insanity under Rule 12.2(b).3 1
Some federal courts have held, after analyzing the advisory committee notes
to the 1983 Amendment of Rule 12.232 and the wording of Rule 12.2(c)"pursuant to 18 U.S.C. [§] 4241 or [§] 4242,"-that a trial court is
precluded from compelling a psychiatric examination of the defendant
unless the specific issues of competency to stand trial or insanity are at
issue.33 In UnitedStates v. Davis, for example, the Sixth Circuit found that
neither Rule 12.2(c) nor 18 U.S.C. § 4242 authorized the court to mandate
an independent examination. 34 The Davis court did hold, however, that the
trial court had "inherent authority to order a reasonable, non-custodial
30 Id. § 7.42.
31

See United States v. White, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1198 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 1998) ("A con-

flict exists among federal courts over whether Rule 12.2(c) provides authority for a
court-ordered mental examination upon a defendant's notice of intent to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect under Rule 12.2(b).").
32 See FED. R. CRiM. P. 12.2(c) advisory committee notes (1983 Amendment);
MACCARTHY & ROWLAND, supra note 29, § 7.42 (noting that "[t]he Advisory Committee
explained that the [current version of the rule] was intended to reflect the government's
authority to examine the defendant in situations other than ...[the] traditional insanity defense").
33 See United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1295 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that Rule
12.2(c) did not authorize, in light of Fifth Amendment concerns, the district court to order a
45-day commitment for psychiatric examination based on the defendant's notice of her intent
to offer the defenses of diminished capacity, mental disease or defect, or incapacity to form
specific intent, but that the court nonetheless has inherent authority to so authorize a commitment); United States v. July, 958 F.2d 379, No. CR-89-99-DAE, 1992 WL 57428, at *1 (9th
Cir. Mar. 25, 1992) (unpublished table decision) (holding that Rule 12.2(c) did not give the
trial court authority to order a government psychiatric examination of a negativing defendant,
but holding that the court had inherent authority to do so); United States v. Akers, 945 F.
Supp. 1442, 1446-49 (D. Colo. 1996) (relying on Davis in holding that Rule 12.2(c) did not
authorize the court to order a psychiatric examination of the defendant who intended to rely
on expert testimony concerning a mental condition relating to guilt but did not intend to raise
the defense of insanity); United States v. Marenghi, 893 F. Supp. 85, 99 & n.22 (D. Me. 1995)
(holding that "the [d]efendant may not be compelled to submit to a psychiatric examination,"
and finding that the trial court's contrary interpretation of Rule 12.2(c) in United States v.
Vega-Penarete, 137 F.RD. 233, 235 (E.D.N.C. 1991), was "off the mark"); cf United States
v. Bell, 855 F. Supp. 239, 240-41 (N.D. I1l. 1994) (holding that the government was not entitled to a mental examination of the defendant because Rule 12.2 is inapplicable to a duress
defense).
34 See Davis, 93 F.3d at 1291 ("Section 4242 neither permits nor requires a court-ordered
examination by the government regarding the defendant's 'mental condition' at the time of the
alleged offense when the defendant gives notice of her intent to rely on expert testimony on
that subject." (citation omitted)); see id. at 1295 ("Rule 12.2(c) [does] not authorize the district court to order the examination of the defendant regarding her mental condition at the time
of the alleged offense.").
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trial court had "inherent authority to order a reasonable, non-custodial examination of [the] defendant under appropriate circumstances," 35 but
warned of possible constitutional concerns in doing so, depending on the
circumstances of the case.36 On the other hand, courts in some jurisdictions
have found that Rule 12.2(c) does authorize a court to order a psychiatric
37
evaluation of a defendant who plans to rely on a negativing defense.
These courts and some scholars are concerned that not allowing the State to
examine a defendant in these circumstances opens the "back door" for otherwise impermissible testimony because the defendant, though opting not to
take the stand herself, effectively is testifying through
the defense psychia38
trist and is thereby insulated from cross-examination.
35 Id. But cf United States v. Towns, 19 F. Supp. 2d 64, 67 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (declining
to use the court's inherent authority to compel a defendant, who was relying on a negativing
defense, to undergo a government psychiatric examination). The Seventh Circuit has explained that "this authority is more specifically denominated 'supervisory power' in the
criminal context," White, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1198 n.2, and has likened "inherent authority" in a
civil context to "its cousin in criminal law the 'supervisory power,"' id. (quoting Soo Line
R.R. v. Escanaba & Lake Superior R.R., 840 F.2d 546, 551 (7th Cir. 1988)). This Comment
will use these terms interchangeably.
36 See Davis, 93 F.3d at 1295 n.8 (explaining that although "[e]xclusion [of incriminating
statements obtained through compelled examination] is a remedy for a constitutional violation[,] the defendant should not be precluded from preventing the constitutional violation from
occurring").
37 See United States v. Lewis, 53 F.3d 29, 35 n.9 (4th Cir. 1995) (finding that the district
court did not err in ordering a psychological examination of the defendant in light of the defendant's stated intention to rely upon a claim of subnormal intelligence to support his entrapment defense); United States v. Mogenhan, 168 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996) (holding that a
defendant, who attempted to negative a specific mental condition that was an element of the
charged offenses by offering evidence that she suffered from "memory loss" as a result of migraine headaches, could be required to submit to independent medical evaluation); VegaPenarete, 137 F.R.D. at 236 (ordering a defendant who intended to rely on evidence that she
suffered from "Battered Wife Syndrome" to submit to a mental examination to verify that defense); United States v. Banks, 137 F.R.D. 20, 21-22 (C.D. 111.1991) (finding that the government was entitled to perform psychological or psychiatric examinations upon a defendant
who asserted the defense that he suffered from obstructive sleep apnea); cf United States v.
Stackpole, 811 F.2d 689, 697 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that an arson defendant who gave notice
that he would raise a mental competency defense was properly ordered by virtue of discovery
rules to submit to an examination by the government's expert regarding mental competency).
38 Interview with Stephen J. Morse, Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School, and Professor of Psychology and Law in Psychiatry,
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine, in Philadelphia, Pa. (Apr. 1998); see also
White, supra note 26, at 869-70 (expressing the concerns of defense attorneys in death penalty
cases that a "defendant's statements to the psychiatrist might enable the prosecutor to discover
evidence it would not have otherwise found, and ... enhance the possibility of a death sentence"). But cf.People v. Rosenthal, 617 P.2d 551, 555 (Colo. 1980) (en banc) ("If the prosecution is permitted to make unrestricted use at the guilt trial of the defendant's psychiatric
communications during a sanity examination by a privately retained psychiatrist, the defendant in effect becomes a witness against herself through the conduit of the psychiatric examiner.").
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The Supreme Court has yet to comment on this specific issue, and, at
the time of this writing, only three circuit courts have addressed it.39 An examination of these cases-and their conclusions about whether a trial court
may compel a negativing defendant to undergo a government psychiatric
examination-will lay the foundation for this Comment's assertion that
Rule 12.2(c) should be revised in order to clear up this ambiguity and to
protect more carefully a defendant's constitutional rights.
II. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION OF RULE 12.2 AND THE
PROBLEM WITH INHERENT AUTHORITY
A review of current federal case law on the issue of whether Rule
12.2(c) allows a court to compel a negativing defendant to undergo a government psychiatric examination will illustrate the statutory construction
problems with Rule 12.2(c). This review will also preface some of the constitutional and practical issues that arise from the rule's ambiguity.
A. The Opinions of the UnitedStates Circuit Courts of.Appeals
1. United States v. Davis
In UnitedStates v. Davis, Margaret Knape Davis filed an interlocutory
appeal from the district court's decision to commit her for forty-five days
for a psychiatric examination pursuant to Rule 12.2 and 18 U.S.C. § 4242.40
Davis gave notice pursuant to Rule 12.2(b) that she intended to offer "diminished capacity and/or mental disease and/or defect and/or incapacity to
form specific intent" as defenses to fraud and counterfeit charges.41 The
district court ordered the commitment to determine both Davis's competency to stand trial as well as her mental state at the time of the offense.42

39 See Davis, 93 F.3d at 1289-95 (explaining the court's holding that Rule 12.2(c) did
not
authorize a compelled examination of a negativing defendant); Lewis, 53 F.3d at 35 n.9
(holding, without explanation, that Rule 12.2(c) provided authority for the district court to
order a psychological examination of a defendant seeking to admit evidence of subnormal
intelligence as a negativing defense); United States v. July, 958 F.2d 379, No. CR-89-99DAE, 1992 WL 57428, at *I (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 1992) (unpublished table decision) (agreeing

with the trial court that "the clear language of [Rule] 12.2(c) permits an exam only pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 4241 (referring to mental incompetency to stand trial) and 18 U.S.C. § 4242 (referring to insanity defenses)").
40 93 F.3d at 1287.

41 Id. at 1288 (citation and internal quotations omitted).
42 See id. (explaining that the district court judge stated that commitment was necessary
for the examination in part because "the examination has to be cognizant of the fact that the
claim of diminished capacity covers a long period of time and specific periods of time, which
based on my experience with psychologists in the past has been difficult to do").
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The Sixth Circuit explained that it must decide whether the district
court was authorized to order an examination at all before turning to the issue of whether the district court was authorized to commit the defendant for
the examination. 4u The court found no authority under 18 U.S.C. § 4242,
the statute governing the determination of insanity at the time of the offense, 44 to allow the district court to permit the government's examination
of the defendant. The court reasoned that 18 U.S.C. § 4242 pertains specifically to insanity, whereas Davis intended to introduce expert testimony in
45
support of a negativing defense.
Davis, in fact, specifically disclaimed an
46
insanity.
on
intent to rely
The government based its request for an independent examination of
Davis on Rule 12.2(c), and the court found the structure of this rule in the
47
context of the other subparts of Rule 12.2 to be crucial to the analysis.
Specifically, the court looked at the language of Rule 12.2, including
the "syntactic structure of the first sentences of subdivisions (a) and
(b). 48 The court was also concerned with how "a compelled examination may implicate [a] defendant's Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination... [and]' Sixth
Amendment rights to counsel and to compel
9
witnesses in her favor. 4
The Davis court then explained that one could read the plain terms of
Rule 12.2(c) to provide for a compelled examination of a defendant pursuant to the competency statute, 18 U.S.C. § 4241, and the insanity statute, 18
U.S.C. § 4242. The court noted, however, that Rule 12.2(c) makes no mention of a compelled examination of a defendant who intends to present expert testimony regarding her mental condition in a context other than insan-

43 See id. at 1290 (noting that "[llogically, the second question cannot be reached until

the first question is answered affirmatively").
44 18 U.S.C. § 4242 (1994) ("Upon the filing of a notice ... that the defendant intends to
rely on the defense of insanity, the court, upon motion of the attorney for the Government,
shall order that a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant be conducted
4

'See Davis, 93 F.3d at 1291 ("Section 4242 neither permits nor requires a court-ordered
examination by the government regarding the defendant's 'mental condition' at the time of the
alleged offense when the defendant gives notice of her intent to rely on expert testimony on
that subject").
46 See id. ("Defendant did not give notice of her intent to rely on the defense of insanity,
and disclaims any such intent.").
47 See id. at 1291-92 (emphasizing the importance of the syntactic composition
of the
rule).
Id. at 1292; see also supranote 22 (providing the full text of Rule 12.2).
49 Davis, 93 F.3d at 1290-91 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 1290-91
nn.1-3.
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ity. 5° The court also examined the advisory committee notes to Rule 12.2
and concluded that "[t]he commentary to Rule 12.2(b) does not demonstrate
the drafters intended the notice to prompt a court-ordered examination of
the defendant under Rule 12.2(c)." 51 Accordingly, the court reasoned that
Rule 12.2(c) does not provide the authority
for the district court to compel
52
the examination of a negativing defendant.
Without citing any precedent or other authority, the Davis court went on
to say that the statutes and rules did not preclude the district court from using its "inherent authority to order a reasonable, non-custodial examination
of a defendant under appropriate circumstances., 53 The court, however, did
express concern over issues of self-incrimination that might arise, stating
that these issues could change the outcome depending on the circumstances
of each case. 54 The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court on
the ground that the "proper parameters of the courts' inherent authority can
only be determined based on concrete cases or controversies, after development of the factual and legal issues at the district court level. 55
2. UnitedStates v. July
Four years prior to the Davis decision, in United States v. July, the
Ninth Circuit reviewed the fate of Stacey July, who offered a battered
spouse defense while on trial for the first-degree murder of her husband 6
The district court granted the government's motion to examine the defendant prior to trial, but the examining expert witnesses did not testify. 7 The
jury found July guilty of second-degree murder, and on appeal, July ob-

50 See id. at 1292-93 (explaining that "the introduction of expert testimony regarding a

mental condition, disease, or defect does not particularly suggest the need for an examination
of the defendant, let alone require it").
51 Id. at 1294.
52 See id. at 1295 ("[W]e conclude that Rule 12.2(c) did not authorize the district court to
order the examination of the defendant regarding her mental condition at the time of the alleged offense.").
53 Id.Unlike other courts, the Sixth Circuit in Davis did not acknowledge that "resorting
to inherent authority is inappropriate where the issue can be decided under a specific statute or
rule." United States v. White, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1198 n.1 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
54 See Davis, 93 F.3d at 1295 (adding that the court was not required to decide this issue
since Davis consented to the examination, thereby waiving the privilege against selfincrimination); see also infra Part 1I (discussing the constitutional issues raised by Rule
Davis,93 F.3d at 1295.
56 958 F.2d 379, No. CR-89-99-DAE, 1992 WL 57428, at *1 (9th Cir. Mar. 25, 1992)
(unpublished table decision).
57 The defense also hired a psychologist who was an expert on spousal abuse to examine
July and to testify. See id. at * 1.
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jected to the government's psychiatric examination.58 The district court
held-like the Davis court but without its detailed reasoning-that, although
Rule 12.2(c) does not allow the government to examine July, the trial court
has inherent authority to order such an examination.5 9 On review, the Ninth
Circuit agreed with the district court on this point but cautioned that this
authority "is not unlimited: an examination cannot impermissibly infringe
upon the defendant's
constitutional guaranties or otherwise exceed the
60
discretion."
court's
Unlike Margaret Davis, Stacey July claimed that she was not actually
offering a mental abnormality defense, but that her expert's testimony that
she suffered from Battered Woman Syndrome ("BWS") was relevant to "the
reasonableness of her response to the actions of her husband."6' The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that, even though the district court "failed to recognize the
distinctions between a mental state defense and battered woman syndrome
evidence, its rationale for allowing the exam nevertheless applie[d]. 6 2 That
rationale involved the district court's belief that the examination was the
"most trustworthy means for the government to verify the defendant's
claims." 63 The Ninth Circuit also stated that because the "government has
the burden of proof, it should have access to the same type and quality of
evidence as the defense." 64 Thus, the Ninth Circuit determined that the
question whether July presented evidence of BWS as a mental state defense
was inapposite. 65
3. UnitedStates v. Lewis
In contrast to Davis and July, in United States v. Lewis the Fourth Circuit held that the district court was correct in ordering a psychiatric examination pursuant to Rule 12.2(c) in light of the defendant's stated intent to
5s See id. at * 1-2 (noting July's objections to the court's authority to order the examina-

tion as well as constitutional violations that allegedly resulted).
59 See id. at *I ("District courts have 'wide latitude ... to carry out successfully [their]
mandate to effectuate, as far as possible, the speedy and orderly administration of justice' to
ensure fundamental fairness. Under this broad standard, the court below properly used its
authority to order the mental examination.' (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Richter, 488 F.2d 170, 173 (9th Cir. 1973))).
60 Id. Unlike the Davis court, the July court did not elaborate on the nature of July's
examination, regarding its "reasonableness" or whether it had been "custodial."
61

Id.

62

Id

63

Id.

6

Id.

65

See id. ("[The government's] experts were ... entitled to examine July and conduct

their own evaluation of her BWS claim.").
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rely upon a claim of subnormal intelligence in support of an affirmative defense of entrapment. 66 The court did not resort to an inherent authority justification. The Lewis opinion, however, provides little support for arguments on either side of the statutory construction or inherent authority issues
since the court offered virtually no reasoning for this holding. In fact, its
entire treatment of this issue appears at the end of the opinion in one sentence of a footnote offering guidance for the trial court's use on remand:
Finally, we find no error in the district court's order that Lewis undergo a psychological examination before trial pursuant to [Rule] 12.2(c), in light of
Lewis' notice to the government, pursuant to [Rule] 12.2(b), that, as a part of
his entrapment defense, he intended67 to rely on expert testimony to show he had
a sub-normal level of intelligence.
B. Clarificationof the InherentAuthority Issue
from a DistrictCourt Opinion
A federal district court in California, ruling on the same issue as that in
Davis and July, elaborated further on a trial court's inherent authority in the
context of Rule 12.2(c).68 In UnitedStates v. White, the government moved
the court to compel murder defendant Sharonda White to submit to a psychiatric examination by a government expert, arguing that the State needed
to perform its own examination in order to effectively rebut White's diminished capacity defense. 69 The White court found that Rule 12.2(c) did not
authorize the examination, 7 0 yet nonetheless granted the government's motion under the court's inherent or supervisory power. 71 A brief examination
of the White rationale will help to illustrate the inherent authority issue as
courts have applied it to compelled psychiatric examinations in negativing
cases.
First, without any sort of detailed reasoning, White dismissed Rule
12.2(c) as not "providing authority" for the compelled examination of the
defendant.7 2 The opinion, in a footnote, merely cited Davis and Lewis as
66 53 F.3d

29, 35 n.9 (4th Cir. 1995).
Id.
68 See United States v. White, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1197, 1198, 1200-01 (E.D. Cal. 1998)
67

(holding that the use of the court's supervisory power to compel examination was reasonable
and that compelling the defendant to undergo psychiatric examination did not violate her Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination).
69 See id. at 1198 (noting that the government made its motion to compel the examination
under the court's inherent authority).
70 See id. at 1198 n.1 ("[N]othing in Rule 12.2(c) ... provides such authority.").
71 See id. at 1199 ("[U]se of the Court's supervisory power to compel a mental examination is reasonable in this case.").
72 Id. at 1198 n.1.
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standing for opposing views of Rule 12.2(c)'s authority to compel the defendant to be examined in negativing cases.73 It then stated: "Although the
government brings this motion under the Court's inherent authority to avoid
this conflict, resorting to inherent authority is inappropriate where the issue
can be decided under a specific statute or rule. 74 Next, the court asserted
its view that the rule does not provide authority for the compelled examination: "[N]othing in Rule 12.2(c), which authorizes examinations in appropriate cases under 18 U.S.C. § 4241 (concerning a criminal defendant's
mental competency to participate in criminal proceedings) and 18 U.S.C. §
4242 (concerning the defense of insanity), provides such authority.""5
When actually turning to the issue of inherent authority, the White court
relied on both Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 57(b) 76 and Supreme
Court precedent 7 7 authorizing federal courts to use their supervisory powers
to develop procedural rules where Congress and the Constitution have not
specifically done so. 78 The court in White, however, acknowledged other
Supreme Court precedent that "'[p]rinciples of deference counsel restraint
in resorting to inherent power and require its use to be a reasonable response
to the problems and needs that provoke it.' ' 79 The court then ruled that the
use of the supervisory power in Sharonda White's circumstances was indeed
reasonable since "[u]pholding White's refusal to submit to a forensic psychiatric examination by the government would allow White full use of her
own expert's forensic psychiatric findings to develop her diminished capacity defense and deprive the government of the corresponding type and quality of information for its rebuttal. 8 0 The White court thus justified its use of
the supervisory power to grant the government's motion for a forensic psychiatric examination of Sharonda White.

73 See id. ("A conflict exists among federal courts over whether Rule 12.2(c) provides

authority for a court-ordered mental examination upon a defendant's notice of intent to introduce expert testimony relating to a mental disease or defect under Rule 12.2(b).").
74Id.
7 Id.
76 FED. R, CRiM. P. 57(b) ("A judge may regulate practice in any manner consistent with

federal law, [the Rules of Criminal Procedure], and local rules of the district."). The court
also noted that "nothing in Rule 12.2 or its legislative history supplants the Court's supervisoryrower to order a psychiatric examination." White, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.
See United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) ("[G]uided by considerations
of justice' ... and in the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts may, within limits,
formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or the Congress."
(quoting McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332,341 (1943))).
78 See White, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.
79 Id. (alteration in the original) (citation omitted) (quoting Degen v. United States, 517
U.S. 820, 823-24 (1996)).
80 Id.
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The White opinion seems sound. The judge believed that due to Rule
12.2(c)'s latent ambiguity, a court may use its well-recognized inherent
authority to fill in the gaps. 1 The Davis and July opinions are thus bolstered by the White opinion. If a court should only resort to its inherent
authority when the statutes or rules do not determine the issue, then the
Davis and July courts' decisions to compel the examination using inherent
authority after finding that Rule 12.2 does not authorize an examination is
supported by the White court's reasoning.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has stated:
The canon in favor of strict construction is not an inexorable command to
override common sense and evident statutory purpose. It does not require
magnified emphasis upon a single ambiguous word in order to give it a meaning contradictory to the fair import of the whole remaining language. As was
said in United States v. Gaskin, the canon "does not require distortion or nullification of the evident meaning and purpose of the legislation." Nor does it
demand that a statute be given the "narrowest meaning"; it is satisfied if the
words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the
lawmakers.

The Davis court, in particular, took great pains to examine the legislative
intent and the statutory construction of Rule 12.2 in order to give it its "fair
meaning." It then went on essentially to rewrite the rule by finding that the

trial court had inherent authority-albeit under less restrictive circumstances
than the government preferred-to order the examination.
The Davis, July, Lewis, and White cases thus illustrate the need for a re-

vision of Rule 12.2(c) to account for the ambiguity regarding compelled
government psychiatric examinations of defendants who intend to offer
negativing defenses. Several other district court decisions on this issue con-

81 There is much precedent affirning a court's use of inherent authority to compel defen-

dants to undergo psychiatric examinations in various circumstances. See, e.g., United States
v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 338-40 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that, although the district court
lacked statutory authority to order a kidnapping and murder defendant to submit to psychiatric
examination, the court had inherent power to do so as a prerequisite to the defendant introducing his own expert psychiatric testimony at a capital sentencing hearing); United States v.
Phelps, 955 F.2d 1258, 1265 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding inherent authority to compel psychiatric
examination to determine whether the release of the defendant was appropriate after a verdict
of not guilty by reason of insanity); Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75, 78 (4th Cir. 1978)
(asserting that a trial court has inherent authority to order an examination and admit psychiatric testimony regarding sanity at the time of the offense in conjunction with an examination
for competency to stand trial); United States v. Green, 544 F.2d 138, 145 (3d Cir. 1976)
(holding that a court possesses inherent power to appoint its own psychiatrist under 18 U.S.C.
§ 4244 to determine whether a defendant is competent to stand trial).
82 United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 25-26 (1948) (citations omitted).
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firm this need.83 A revision of the rule either explicitly allowing or explicitly forbidding the trial court to compel an examination of defendants in
negativing cases would prevent these courts from resorting to their inherent
authority.
One might ask at this point why Congress should clarify the rule when
the courts simply resort to inherent authority after failing to find authority in
the rule itself. The answer is, for one thing, that a clarifying revision of the
rule would result in judicial efficiency. Leaving the rule unchanged, without explicitly either allowing or precluding compelled government examinations, will merely provide continued fodder for argument between the
government and the defendant on this issue. As a result, unless the rule is
revised, the arguments will continue to come unnecessarily before trial
judges and appellate courts. This Comment will also demonstrate that the
rule needs to be revised for other reasons, the foremost being a need to better safeguard negativing (and insanity) defendants' Fifth and Sixth Amendment protections, an issue to which this Comment now turns.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

An examination of the constitutional issues that confront both negativing and insanity defendants will help further illustrate the need for a revision
of Rule 12.2(c) as well as suggest new language for the rule.
Courts that have considered the constitutional implications of compelling insanity or negativing defendants to undergo government psychiatric
examinations have focused primarily on the Fifth Amendment's protection

83

See, e.g., United States v. Mogenhan, 168 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1996) (requiring a de-

fendant to submit to a medical evaluation when she attempted to negative a mental condition
that was an element of the charged offenses by offering evidence that she suffered from
"memory loss" as result of migraine headaches and concluding that "Rule 12.2(c) was not
intended to only cover those situations involving a traditional insanity defense"); United
States v. Vega-Penarete, 137 F.R.D. 233, 235 (E.D.N.C. 1991) (ordering a Battered Wife
Syndrome defendant to submit to a mental examination, reasoning that the advisory committee notes to the 1983 revision of Rule 12.2 indicated that "the amendment was intended to
reflect the government's authority to examine a defendant in situations other than the traditional insanity defense"); United States v. Banks, 137 F.R.D. 20, 21 (C.D. I11.1991) (allowing
government examination of a defendant who asserted the negativing defense that he suffered
from sleep apnea and concluding that "the drafters of Rule 12.2(c) intended to allow the government to examine a defendant who intends to rely upon expert testimony regarding a mental
condition" other than insanity). But see United States v. Akers, 945 F. Supp. 1442, 1446-49
(D. Colo. 1996) (relying on Davis and holding that Rule 12.2(c) did not authorize the trial
court to order the mental examination of a bank fraud defendant who intended to rely on a
mental condition other than insanity); United States v. Marenghi, 893 F. Supp. 85, 90 (D. Me.
1995) (rejecting the rationale of Banks and Vega-Penareteand concluding that Rule 12.2(c)
allows for court-ordered examinations only when competency or sanity are at issue).
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against self-incrimination.8 4 Additionally, these courts often have considered violations of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel,85 or
more specifically, the right "to obtain a sufficient understanding of the basis
for the government psychiatrist's testimony so that the psychiatrist can be
effectively cross-examined. ' 6
After a brief examination of the constitutional safeguards already explicit in Rule 12.2, this Part will review the various judicial and scholarly
opinions concerning the constitutional implications of compelled examinations of insanity defendants. This review will bolster the assertions that
these protections should apply to negativing defendants as well as to insanity defendants and that Rule 12.2 should lay out such protective devices
more explicitly.
A. The Language ofRule 12.2 in Light of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments
An analysis of the constitutional concerns raised by Rule 12.2(c) in the
context of a negativing defendant should begin by examining the language
of the rule itself, which appears to include a constitutional safeguard against
self-incrimination:
(c) MENTAL EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT....

No statement made by the defendant in the course of any examinationprovidedfor by this rule, whether the
examination be with or without the consent of the defendant, no testimony by
the expert based upon such statement, and no other fruits of the statement shall
be admitted in evidence against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an issue 8respecting
mental condition on which the defendant has intro7
duced testimony.

84 See, e.g., United States v. Byers, 740 F.2d 1104, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (holding that
"when a defendant raises the defense of insanity, he may constitutionally be subjected to
compulsory examination by court-appointed or government psychiatrists ... and when he introduces into evidence psychiatric testimony to support his insanity defense, testimony of
those examining psychiatrists may be received").
85 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1291 n.2 (6th Cir.
1996) ("The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel may be raised because the court-ordered examination is arguably
a 'critical stage' of the proceedings at which the defendant should be permitted to have counsel present if she desires." (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 470 (1981))); United
States v. July, 958 F.2d 379, No. CR-89-99-DAE, 1992 WL 57428, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 25,
1992) (unpublished table decision) (considering a murder defendant's Sixth Amendment
claims that a government psychiatric examination was a "mental deposition"); Byers, 740
F.2d at 1121-22 (holding that no violation of a second-degree murder defendant's right to
counsel occurred when a government psychiatrist examined him without his lawyer present.).
86 White, supra note 26, at 885.
87 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c) (emphasis added).

1999]

THE AMBIGUITY OF FED.R. CRIM. P. 12.2

1423

This part of the rule, of course, begs the question regarding whether
compelled examinations of negativing defendants (as opposed to insanity
defendants) are included among "any examination provided for by this
rule." If the part of Rule 12.2(c) allowing compelled examinations in "appropriate" cases applies only to insanity defense cases and not to negativing
cases, as the Davis court and others have ruled, it would follow that Congress intended this constitutional safeguard to apply only to compelled government examinations of insanity defendants.88 If Congress went to such
great lengths to protect insanity defendants, however, then would it not have
explicitly expressed an intent to protect negativing defendants in a similar
manner?
On the other hand, the advisory committee notes to the 1983 amendment of Rule 12.2 seem to point to the committee's understanding that this
safeguarding language applies only to insanity defendants. The committee
states that this language was amended to:
more accurately reflect the Fifth Amendment considerations at play in this
context. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981), holding that selfincrimination protections are not inevitably limited to the guilt phase of a trial
and that the privilege, when applicable, protects against use of defendant's
statement and also the fruits thereof, including expert testimony based upon
defendant's statements to the expert. Estelle also intimates that "a defendant
can be required to submit to a sanity examination," and presumably some other
form of mental examination, when "his silence may deprive the State of the
only effective means 89it has of controverting his proof on an issue that he interjected into the case."

The committee makes no explicit comment on the application of Rule
12.2(c) to negativing defendants. Their reference to the dicta in Estelle v.
Smith, 90 however, that the court may compel an insanity defendant to be ex88

Note that the advisory committee to the 1975 enactment of Rule 12.2 explains that the

phrase, "in an appropriate case," was necessary to account for the fact that, in certain situations, a trial court cannot constitutionally compel an unwilling defendant to undergo a psychiatric examination. See FED. R.CRIM. P. 12.2 advisory committee notes (1975 Enactment)
(noting also that "[tlhe Committee, by its approval of subdivision (c), intends to take no stand
whatever on the constitutional question"). Nonetheless, the committee did not comment on
whether this phrase applied to a defendant intending to introduce expert testimony relating to
mental disease or defect as it relates to the defendant's mens rea, pursuant to subdivision (b),
as well as insanity defendants pursuant to subdivision (a).
89 FED. R. CRIm. P. 12.2(c) advisory committee notes (1983 Amendment) (citation
omitted).b
90 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981) (holding that a
criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment rights
were violated by the trial court's admission, at the penalty phase, of the testimony of a psychiatrist who performed a competency examination of the defendant without informing him
that he had a right to remain silent). Note, however, that the defendant in Estelle did not raise
an insanity defense.
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amined, seems to imply that they designed the constitutional safeguard in
the rule with insanity defendants in mind. The committee's view, however,
that Estelle also "presumably" requires a defendant to submit to "some other
form of mental examination" may indicate their intention that the rule apply
to negativing defendants as well. "[S]ome other form of mental examination" could include an examination of a negativing defendant to determine
whether she did indeed have the required mens rea when she committed the
crime. On the other hand, it is just as likely that "some other form of mental
examination" was meant to include competency examinations of insanity
defendants. Thus, the advisory committee notes provide little guidance on
this issue.
B. The Courts'Analyses ofthe ConstitutionalImplicationsof
Compelled GovernmentPsychiatricExaminations
A look at the case law concerning the constitutional implications of
compelled psychiatric examinations provides some fuel for the argument
that Congress meant these protections to apply to negativing defendants as
well as insanity defendants, and that, therefore, the courts can compel the
negativing defendant to undergo a government examination. Several federal
circuit court cases have construed Rule 12.2(c) in the insanity context to allow the government to use a defendant's statement made during a courtordered mental examination to rebut testimony tendered to prove an insanity
defense. They ruled that this does not violate the Fifth Amendment's protection against self-incrimination. 91 Some jurisdictions have further upheld
92
the use of such evidence to rebut defense testimony in negativing cases.
91 See, e.g., United States v. Madrid, 673 F.2d 1114, 1120 (10th Cir. 1982) (holding that
where an armed robbery defendant raised an insanity defense and presented evidence on that
issue, the testimony of a psychiatrist for the prosecution did not violate the defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege); United States v. Leonard, 609 F.2d 1163, 1165 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980)
("[E]liciting statements at a compulsory examination is not unconstitutional per se because
any statement about the offense itself could be suppressed." (citing United States v. Cohen,
530 F.2d 43, 47 (5th Cir. 1976))); United States v. Julian, 469 F.2d 371, 376 (10th Cir. 1972)
("[W]hen the defendant has raised the issue of insanity and the psychiatrist is called to testify
on this question, the defendant must not be allowed to muzzle him at his option.").
92 See United States v. Kessi, 868 F.2d 1097, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 1989) (expressing the
appropriateness of using mental examination evidence where the defendant argued that
post-traumatic stress disorder prevented him from forming the requisite mens rea to commit
mail and securities fraud); United States v. Halbert, 712 F.2d 388, 390 (9th Cir. 1983) ("After
raising the issue of mental capacity, Halbert cannot complain that [the government's psychiatrist] used his statements against him."); State v. Hutchinson, 766 P.2d 447, 452 (Wash. 1989)
(holding that a defendant who raises the diminished capacity defense may be ordered to submit to a psychiatric examination by a state expert without violating his Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, and basing this conclusion on the right to reciprocal discovery), affd, 959 P.2d 1061 (Wash. 1998).
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Moreover, at least one state court, the Supreme Court of Washington, has
held that a defendant who asserts diminished capacity waives both the
privilege against self-incrimination and the physician-patient privilege and
that there is no distinction between insanity and diminished capacity in this
regard. 93 This court opined that, in addition to the significant practical implications of denying prosecutors and the jury access to important evidence
on the defendant's mental condition, "privacy is lost when a patient chooses
to place a mental or physical condition in
issue, and a fair determination of
94
privilege."
the
waiving
requires
the issue
Of course, with a consenting defendant, the issue of the appropriateness
of a compelled government examination is moot. Disputes arise in these
situations, however, over how the testimony will be used in court. For example, in United States v. Halbert, the Ninth Circuit found that allowing
into evidence statements made to the government's examining psychiatrist
by a mail fraud defendant who raised a diminished capacity defense did not
violate his Fifth Amendment rights, and therefore were admissible. 95 The
Court opined:
Although diminished capacity technically may not be an insanity defense,

there is no indication that the language in Rule 12.2 regarding statements "on
the issue of guilt" was designed to cover statements relating to defendant's
mental capacity. Issues relating to defendant's mental capacity necessarily
overlap with "the issue of guilt." Because Congress intended to permit the
admission of statements related to insanity, there is little doubt9 that
it also in6
tended to admit statements related to mental capacity in general.

This court's reasoning provides additional support for the conclusion
that Rule 12.2(c) should be amended to explicitly allow compelled government examinations of negativing defendants, while retaining the safeguard-

93 See Hutchinson, 766 P.2d at 453 (noting that the "allowance of a privilege would
de-

prive the State and the jury of important evidence on the defendant's mental condition").
94 Id. (quoting State v. Brewton, 744 P.2d 646, 648 (Wash. 1987) (citing Stephen A.
Saltzburg, PrivilegesandProfessionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists,66 VA. L. REV. 597, 623
(1980)) (internal quotations omitted)). Note, however, that the trial judge has discretion to
decide which statements are incriminating and which are not in a situation where the court
compels a negativing defendant to submit to a government psychiatric examination. See
Hutchinson, 959 P.2d at 1069 ("The trial court must . . . determine the scope of the expert's
testimony at trial, allowing opinions and observations which were not gleaned from incriminating statements."); see also infra Part IV (discussing further the related practical implications of the differing interpretations of Rule 12.2(c)).
95 712 F.2d 388 (explaining that the defendant's argument---that, because his statements
bore on the issue of guilt, their admission violated his right against self-incrimination----"elevates form over substance").
96 Id. at 390.
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ing language precluding the use of their statements for anything other than
rebutting their negativing defenses.
A look now at one scholar's assertions about the constitutional protections required in the context of the insanity defendant facing the death penalty will further support this Comment's conclusion that such protections
should apply to negativing defendants and should be spelled out clearly in
Rule 12.2.
C. ConstitutionalProtectionsRequired in the
Insanity/DeathPenalty Context
In the context of the insanity defendant facing the death penalty, Professor Welsh White asserts that
when a defense psychiatrist, who has examined a capital defendant, testifies on
behalf of that defendant at either the guilt or penalty stage of a capital trial, a
government psychiatrist has the right to conduct the psychiatric examination of
the defendant and to testify on the basis of that
9 7 examination for the purpose of
rebutting the defense psychiatrist's testimony.

This conclusion is not inconsistent with the safeguard already provided
in Rule 12.2(c) and discussed above that "[n]o statement made by the defendant in the course of any examination provided for by this rule... shall
be admitted in evidence against the defendant ... except on an issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced testimony."98 The question then becomes, should the rule's limitation on the use
of evidence derived from government psychiatric examinations apply
equally to insanity and negativing cases?
There appears to be no sound reason for extending this protection to insanity defendants to the exclusion of negativing defendants. The Fifth and
Sixth Amendments do not distinguish between these types of defendants.
Even accepting the Davis and July courts' interpretations of Rule 12.2(c) as
not applying to negativing defendants, a simple revision of the rule explicitly allowing compelled government examinations of negativing defendants
would place such examinations within the category of "any examination
provided for by this rule." 99 Both negativing and insanity defendants would
then be granted the same statutory protection against self-incrimination.
Professor White suggests further limitations on the use of statements
made by capital defendants during compelled government examinations.
He recommends that not only should the government psychiatrist be limited
97 White, supranote 26, at 893.
98 FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.2(c).
99Id.
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to rebutting the defense psychiatrist's testimony, but the government should
also be precluded from using evidence derived from the psychiatric examination to strengthen its case. 100 White comes to this conclusion by drawing
an analogy to the use-derivative-use limitation as set out in Kastigar v.
United States.10 1 He reasons as follows:
Kastigarv. United States and its progeny suggest the scope of protection these
safeguards should provide. In Kastigar,the [Supreme] Court held that requiring a witness who invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege to testify on a grant
of use-immunity will be constitutional only if the government is required to
prove that any evidence subsequently presented against the witness "is derived
from a legitimate source wholly independent from the compelled testimony."
Thus, the Court held that an unwilling witness may be forced to testify only if
he or she is afforded use-derivative-use immunity. In prosecuting the witness,
the government will not be permitted to introduce either the witness' immunized testimony or any evidence obtained as a result of that testimony. Kastigar thus established that the government's use of an individual's compelled
testimony must be limited to the purpose for which it is authorized-in this
case, providing the government
102 psychiatrist with a basis for rebutting the defense psychiatrist's testimony.

White goes on to explain, though, that enforcing such a limitation is
more difficult in the compelled psychiatric examination context than in the
Kastigaruse-derivative-use immunity context because the government psychiatrist ordinarily examines the defendant privately, making no record
available to the defense. A witness's testimony in response to a grant of
use-immunity, however, is made on the record.'0 3 Thus, "[w]ithout knowing the content of the testimonial evidence revealed during the psychiatric
examination, the defense would not be in an adequate position to determine
whether evidence subsequently used by the prosecutor.., was in fact derived from statements made by the defendant to the government psychiatrist." 10 4 White suggests, therefore, that the government should be required
10 5
to provide the defense with a transcript of the psychiatric examination.

1oo See White, supra note 26, at 884-86, 893 (noting that "[t]he government psychiatric
examination differs from cross-examination of a defendant who testifies in his defense in that
it takes place prior to trial").
101 406 U.S. 441 (1972).

White, supra note 26, at 885-86 (citations omitted).
See id.at 886 ("[A] government psychiatric examination occurs in secret, and no record of the statements made by the defendant to the government psychiatrist is available to the
defense.").
102
103

104 Id.

See id. (explaining that this is necessary "so that the defense will be able to ascertain
the content of the defendant's statements").
105
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White additionally suggests that, if the defense psychiatrist has not
questioned the defendant about past criminal conduct, then this should preclude a government psychiatrist from asking such questions as well. The
defendant should thus be allowed to assert Fifth Amendment objections to
specific questions posed by the psychiatrist. 10 6 White reasons that, even if
the law treats a psychiatric examination as analogous to a scientific investigation-wherein the inquiry into the defendant's prior criminal conduct is
both appropriate as well as necessary to test the validity of the defense psychiatrist's conclusion-the defendant's Fifth Amendment interests outweigh
the usefulness of the inquiry. Specifically, the defendant's interests in limiting the scope of the psychiatric examination and in not being required to
incriminate herself as to other crimes outweigh7 the government's need to
0
acquire reliable psychiatric rebuttal testimony.
Concerning the defendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation,
White argues that the psychiatric examination "may lead to unreliable government evidence, and the reliability of that evidence will be affected by the
procedures followed during the confrontation." 108 He suggests that, since
"the defendant will not be in a position to reconstruct the critical elements
of the confrontation"--namely the government psychiatrist's mannerisms
and the defendant's demeanor and affect-the most reliable method to safeguard her right to effectively cross-examine
the government psychiatrist
10 9
would be to videotape the examination.
In light of practical considerations and issues of judicial economy,
however, the legislature should address this particular safeguard as a discretionary element of any revision to Rule 12.2(c). A mandatory videotaping
of all psychiatric examinations of insanity or negativing defendants would
undoubtedly be inefficient and would raise a host of issues related to technical difficulties and the specifics of videotaping. In revising Rule 12.2, a
reasonable middle ground would be to give the trial judge the option, at the
defendant's request, to require the government to videotape the examination. This option should be limited to cases where it might be difficult for
the defense to reconstruct some of the critical elements of the examination.

106 See id. at 882, 893-94 ("[I]f the government fails to provide a mechanism
that will
allow the defense to cross-examine the government psychiatrist effectively as to the basis for
her conclusion[s,]... [then those conclusions] derived from the psychiatric examination
should be excluded.").
107 See id. at 880-81 ("mhe psychiatric examination should be viewed as analogous to a
scientific inquiry or investigation in which the objective is to obtain an accurate conclusion as
to the defendant's mental condition at the time of the offense.").
108 Id. at 887.
109 Id. at 887-88.
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Capital cases, on which Professor White focused, demand stricter constitutional protections than noncapital cases. Rule 12.2, however, does not
distinguish between capital and noncapital cases in any sense. White's conclusions about compelled government psychiatric examinations in the capital context would therefore seem applicable in noncapital cases as well.
Given White's persuasive arguments, it is appropriate that any revision
of Rule 12.2 include limitations similar to those he suggests, namely (1) an
assurance that the language in the second part of subsection (c) concerning
the Estelle-related constitutional protections includes examinations of negativing defendants among "any examination provided for by this rule"; (2) a
requirement that the government record the examination and provide a transcript to the defense to insure that the information obtained during the examination will not be used to strengthen inappropriately its case; (3) a provision that the government may not inquire into any past criminal conduct
not broached by the defense's psychiatrist; and (4) a provision that, when
the trial court deems necessary, a videotape of the examination should be
made available to the defense in order to insure their ability to adequately
cross-examine the government's psychiatrist.
After a brief examination of some of the practical considerations involved in revising the rule, this Comment will offer a proposed revision of
the rule encompassing these considerations.
IV. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
The defendant's constitutional protections discussed in the preceding
Part must be tempered by the legitimate, practical needs of our adversarial
system.1 0 Aside from the usually obvious relevance of evidence concerning
mental state as an element of the crime charged,"' the adversarial system2
ordinarily requires fair and reciprocal discovery of this type of evidence."
110 But cf Welsh S. White, The Psychiatric Examination and the Fifih Amendment
Privilege in Capital Cases, 74 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 943, 988 (1983) (asserting that
"[t]he government's right to impose conditions on the defendant's use of psychiatric testimony... must be limited by its legitimate interest in promoting the inherent fairness of that
constitutional right").
IIICf Mandiberg, supra note 2, at 223 (noting that restrictions on the admission of
mental state evidence operate "despite the clear relevance of the evidence to the mental state
element of the crime charged, the competence of the defense witnesses and the excellence of
their observations").
112 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E), (b)(1)(C) (requiring the government to disclose information regarding its expert witnesses to the defendant if she requests it, and requiring reciprocal discovery from the defendant regarding her expert witnesses). Although traditionally, criminal defendants have enjoyed protection against disclosing as much information as
the prosecution must disclose, there is currently "a nationwide trend of expanded prosecutorial
discovery in criminal cases." Mark A. Esqueda, Note, Michigan Strives to Balance the Adver-

1430

UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW

[Vol. 147:1403

In addition, the government should have access to information that is not
distorted in any way by the defense psychiatrist in situations where the court
may limit the prosecution's ability to cross-examine the expert and preclude
the prosecution from performing its own examination.
Concerning the issue of reciprocal discovery, one judge has stated: "It
would be anomalous if a defendant were permitted to offer psychiatric testimony on his own behalf, and then to preclude the government from offering contradictory testimony by refusing a court-ordered psychiatric exami13
Rule [12.2] was designed to prevent this possibility."'
nation....
Focusing more on the specific rules of discovery, other courts also have
ruled in favor of the government on the issue of compelled examinations of
negativing defendants.1 1 4 The First Circuit, for example, held that the trial
court properly ordered an arson defendant who gave notice that he would
raise a mental abnormality defense to submit to an examination by the government's expert regarding mental competency,
reasoning simply that
1 15
"[r]eciprocal discovery is a two way street."
Closely related to the reciprocal discovery issue is the concern that
some judges and scholars have expressed with respect to preventing the defendant from presenting a distorted or "garbled" version of the critical facts.
This issue arises when the defendant is allowed to present her own psychiatric examination without a rebuttal presentation from a government psychiatrist who also has examined the defendant.1 6 To prevent such garbling,
sarialProcess and Seek the Truth with Its New Reciprocal Criminal Discovery Rule, 74 U.
DET. MERCY L. REv. 317, 317-19 (1997). The majority of states now require reciprocal discove 7 , and most provide for "independent prosecutorial discovery." Id. at 327.
United States v. Campbell, 675 F.2d 815, 822 (6th Cir. 1982) (Martin, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part).
114 See, e.g., United States v. Stackpole, 811 F.2d 689, 697 (1st Cir. 1987) (basing its
holding to allow the compelled examination on FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a) and (b) (discovery

rule s))k.
116 For example, Professor White explains in the insanity defense context:
If not subjected to further testing, the defendant's statements may be "garbled" because they have been evaluated only by a psychiatrist who has reached an opinion
favorable to the defense, and whose testimony is therefore likely to be elicited by defense counsel in a way that puts it in the best possible light for the defense.

White, supra note 26, at 878; see also United States v. Cohen, 530 F.2d 43, 48 (5th Cir. 1976)
(asserting that if a defendant raises insanity as a defense and introduces psychiatric testimony,
"the government will seldom have a satisfactory method of meeting defendant's proof on the
issue of sanity except by the testimony of a psychiatrist it selects .. . who has had the opportunity to form a reliable opinion by examining the accused"). Similarly, Judge Learned Hand
asserted that the purpose of the testimonial waiver doctrine-wherein the defendant waives
his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination when he is cross-examined after
choosing to testify at trial-is to prevent the defendant from presenting a "garbled" version of
the critical facts. See United States v. St. Piene, 132 F.2d 837, 840 (2d Cir. 1942) (explaining
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courts should allow the government to examine
a negativing defendant in
11 7
order to rebut the defense experts' testimony.
One also should consider judicial economy and the avoidance of redundancy in any revision of Rule 12.2. This Comment has suggested, for example, that a revision of the rule should clarify the phrase "in an appropriate
case." 18 There have been various interpretations of this phrase. The Davis
court, for example, opined that the phrase was there perhaps because, "unlike a claim of insanity, a mental condition, disease or defect requires a case
by case analysis to determine whether a psychiatric or psychological examination of the defendant will be necessary for the government fairly to rebut
the defendant's expert evidence."' 1 9 Nonetheless, the meaning of the phrase
remains unclear. A logical solution would be to eliminate it from the rule
and instead give the trial court discretion to decide against compelling the
examination of either a negativing or insanity defendant if such an examination would infringe upon the defendant's constitutional rights or sacrifice
judicial economy. Such a provision would address the Davis court's concern about an absolute requirement in the face of situations where an examination of a negativing defendant may not be necessary for the prosecution adequately to rebut the defense expert's testimony. For example, in
situations where the government already has had the opportunity to examine
the defendant (such as a competency determination), and the government
also has access to all of the defendant's psychiatric reports, it seems prudent
to give the trial court the discretion to deny
the government's request for a
120
compelled examination of the defendant.
V. A PROPOSED REVISION OF RULE 12.2
The examination of the ambiguities of the language of Rule 12.2, specifically subsection (c), indicates the need for a revision of this language in
order to better guide attorneys and judges regarding their application of this
rule to negativing defendants. Despite some soundly reasoned arguments
that the Fifth Amendment is a privilege "to suppress the truth, but that does not mean that it is
a privilege to garble it;
it should not furnish one side with what may be false evidence and
deprive the other of any means of detecting the imposition").
117 See White, supra note 26, at 893 (concluding that "the prosecutor must be permitted
to present psychiatric testimony derived from a government psychiatric examination so that
the accuracy of the defense psychiatrist's testimony may be adequately tested").
118 See supra PartII.
119 United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1293 (6th Cir.
1996).
120 But cf.State v. Clark, 493 S.E.2d 770, 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the trial
court committed no error in ordering a first-degree murder defendant "to undergo a third psychiatric evaluation for the purpose of allowing the State to rebut his diminished capacity defense"), cert. denied,501 S.E.2d 913 (N.C. 1998).
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that Rule 12.2(c) does not allow a court to compel a negativing defendant to
be examined by a government psychiatrist, there are no sound reasons for
maintaining an examination exclusion for negativing defendants once they
raise a negativing defense. Judicial economy, fairness to the prosecution,
and issues of reciprocal discovery support this notion. Furthermore, even
those judges who have argued convincingly in favor of negativing defendants on this issue have sought to compel the examination, nonetheless, by
virtue of the court's inherent authority to do so.' 2 ' An examination of the
constitutional protections and restrictions faced by insanity defendants lends
further support to the proposition that these issues are not and should not be
dissimilar in negativing cases.
In an effort to ameliorate the ambiguity in the language of Rule 12.2
and in the various interpretations of the different issues inherent in this rule,
and in an effort to eliminate the need for courts to turn to the doctrine of inherent authority, the following revision of the Rule 12.2(c) is suggested:
Rule 12.2. Notice of Insanity Defense or Expert Testimony of Defendant's
Mental Condition
(c) MENTAL EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT.

(1) DEFENDANT RELYING UPON THE DEFENSE OF INsANITY. The court
may, upon motion of the attorney for the government, order a defendant
who has given notice pursuant to subsection (a) of this rule to submit to
an examination pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4241 or § 4242.
(2) DEFENDANT INTENDING TO INTRODUCE EXPERT TESTIMONY
RELATING TO MENTAL CONDITION As IT RELATES TO THE ISSUE OF GUILT.

The court may, upon motion of the attorney for the government, order that
a defendant who has given notice pursuant to subsection (b) of this rule
submit to a reasonable non-custodial psychiatric examination by a psychiatrist or psychologist, and that a psychiatric or psychological report be
filed with the court, pursuant to the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 4247(b) and

Cc).
(3) No statement made by the defendant in the course of any examination provided for by this rule, whether the examination be with or without the consent of the defendant, no testimony by the expert based upon
such statement, and no other fruits of the statement shall be admitted in
evidence against the defendant in any criminal proceeding except on an
issue respecting mental condition on which the defendant has introduced
testimony.
(4) LmuirrAnONS BY EXAMINER. Unless such information is otherwise discoverable by way of Fed. R. Crim. P. 16, the examiner who conducts the examination of defendant pursuant to subsections (c)(1) and
(c)(2) shall not question the defendant about criminal activity in which he

121 See supra notes 31-37, 39-86 and accompanying text (discussing these and other

cases).
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or she may have participated prior to the crime for which he or she is currently being charged.
(5) RECORD OF EXAmNAnTON. Notwithstanding the reporting requirements of 18 U.S.C. §§ 4241, 4242, or subsection (c)(2) of this rule,
the government psychiatrist or psychologist shall provide a verbatim transcript of his or her examination to the court and to the defense. If the trial
court deems necessary, this transcript shall be accompanied by a videotaped recording of the examination wherein the actions of both the examiner and the defendant are recorded.

Section (c) is now subdivided into five subsections. Subsection (1) restates the part of the existing subsection (c) of the rule that allows the court
to compel an insanity defendant to undergo a government psychiatric examination. This revision, though, rids the rule of the ambiguity inherent in
the phrase "in an appropriate case" by simply deleting it.
Subsection (2) is essentially the mirror image of subsection (1) and was
added to clarify the most significant ambiguity of the rule. It explicitly
authorizes courts to compel similar examinations of defendants who have
given notice of their intent to offer negativing evidence. 122 This subsection
also takes into account the Davis court's constitutional concerns and limits
this examination to one that is "reasonable [and] non-custodial. 123
Subsection (3) remains unchanged. It restricts the government to using
testimony in a compelled examination of a negativing defendant to rebuttal
evidence.12 4 Subsection (4) attempts to address more precisely the constitutional issues examined in this Comment by further precluding a government
psychiatrist from asking questions
about prior crimes into which the defense
12
psychiatrist did not inquire. 5
Finally, subsection (5) was added to further safeguard against the malevolent use of insanity and negativing defendants' testimony by requiring
the government psychiatrist to submit a verbatim transcript of the examination to the court and to defense counsel.12 6 This subsection authorizes the
court, at its discretion, to further safeguard a defendant's constitutional
rights by ordering a videotaped recording of the examination. 2 7 This subsection does not, however, specify prerequisites for the court's use of this
discretion, thus allowing both sides to make arguments for its use if desired.
122 See supra Parts II, 1I.B, IV (explaining the various reasons for revising the rule to

explicitly allow courts to compel a negativing defendant to undergo a government examination).
12 United States v. Davis, 93 F.3d 1286, 1296 (6th Cir. 1996).
124 See supranotes 111-15 and accompanying
text.
125See supranotes 120-21 and accompanying
text.
126 See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
127 See supra text accompanying note 109.
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Therefore, in many instances, the government may actually be the party
asking for the videotape, rather than the defendant. Accordingly, the court
may use this provision not only for constitutional safeguarding purposes,
but also to balance out issues of reciprocal discovery where they may appear
one-sided, especially if the government feels that a videotape of the defendant could prove helpful to its case.
CONCLUSION

In order for a defense attorney like Maria Fuentes to adequately represent a client like John Barleycorn, she must be able to assure him full protection of his constitutional rights. In an attempt to argue that John Barleycorn did not have the mens rea to commit first-degree murder because of
severe emotional problems on that fateful Thursday night, she should be entitled to offer expert testimony to that effect. At the same time, the federal
prosecutor should not be unduly restrained by an inability to rebut the defense psychiatrist's findings.
Currently, the provision of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12.2 regarding compelled government psychiatric examinations is ambiguous regarding its application to negativing defendants in addition to insanity defendants. An examination of the statutory construction issues, as well as the
constitutional and practical implications that Rule 12.2 has for both sides,
leads to the conclusion that the rule needs revision. The revised rule should
grant the government the ability to examine a negativing defendant just as
the current rule grants the government the ability to examine an insanity defendant. This Comment's proposed revision of Rule 12.2 attempts to solve
the current ambiguity by explicitly allowing a compelled government examination of a negativing defendant, thus allowing fair reciprocal investigation of the defendant's claimed mental disease or defect. The proposed revision also attempts to place more accurately and explicitly limits on the
government's use of the information obtained in compelled examinations.

